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     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     AMADO S. PLA, KEVIN JOSEPH,
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     and YISHMAEL LEVI,
     individually, and on behalf of
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     all other persons similarly
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     situated,
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                    Plaintiffs,
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                                             12 CV 5268 (JMF)
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     RENAISSANCE EQUITY HOLDINGS,
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     L.L.C., CLIPPER EQUITY,
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     L.L.C., MY GUARD SECURITY
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     CORP., DAVID BISTRICER, RAFAEL
     GARCIA, MARC ANTHONY GARCIA,
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     and JOHN MURPHY,
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                    Defendants.
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     -----x
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                                             New York, N.Y.
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                                             May 9, 2013
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                                             10:30 a.m.
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     Before:
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                          HON. JESSE M. FURMAN,
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                                             District Judge
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                               APPEARANCES
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     PETER J. ANDREWS
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          Attorney for Plaintiffs
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     FRANKLIN GRINGER & COHEN, P.C.
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          Attorneys for Defendants
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     BY:
          JOSHUA A. MARCUS
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SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

THE COURT: When a party files a consent-to-opt-in form in an FLSA case, do you agree that that party becomes essentially a plaintiff for purposes of the action going forward?

MR. MARCUS: They become a party. Obviously, they've joined the action, but they haven't become a named party in enforcing all of their rights.

THE COURT: Let me give you a hypothetical. Assume that on October 21, 2012, Tawanda Thompson had opted in, had filed her consent-to-join form and assume that on October 22, as happened, you made an offer of judgment to the three previous named plaintiffs but not Tawanda Thompson. Do you agree that the case would not have been mooted in those circumstances?

MR. MARCUS: Yes, your Honor. I would agree with that. I think the defendants can only make an offer as to people who are in the case. You can't just have a moving target as you try to resolve the case.

THE COURT: I'm not parleying with that. I just want to understand.

Is there anything further you want to add? Otherwise, I'm going to hear from your adversary.

MR. MARCUS: I don't think so, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Andrews, my question for you is: No 1, is there any dispute that the offer of judgment made on SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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October 22 exceeds the amount of the three original named plaintiffs' claims?

MR. ANDREWS: Yes, your Honor. There is a dispute. Discovery is ongoing. Mr. Pla, one of the named plaintiffs, will be deposed shortly. We have never agreed and do not feel that the numbers offered by the defendants are unchallenged, undisputed numbers.

THE COURT: Right. And can you specify or articulate in what way it is disputed? Because you have now had approximately six or seven months in which to come forth with evidence to support the proposition that it does not exceed the plaintiffs' claims or to articulate in some way what the nature of the dispute is, and of you have not done so.

MR. ANDREWS: While the case has gone on for six months, not a whole lot has happened during that six months. The first deposition in the case only took place this week of Mr. Garcia, director of operations. We still have some outstanding discovery disputes regarding payroll records from the security guard company. The named plaintiffs have not been deposed. There's still a lot of uncertainty as to whether these numbers are accurate or how accurate they are. This offer of judgment, as the Court noted, by its own terms expired shortly after it was made. It didn't make sense to accept it then. We moved on.

THE COURT: There are at least two cases, Ward v. Bank SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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1 of New York, 455 F.Supp.2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), and Briggs v. 2

Arthur T. Mott Real Estate LLC, 2006 WL 3314624 (E.D.N.Y.,

November 14, 2006) that are similar in the sense that there's a

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motion to dismiss based on the proposition that the offer

exceeded the plaintiff's claims, and, in both cases, the court 5

held that the plaintiff had possession of the time sheets

submitted by the defendant for, lo, these many months and

failed to raise any issues with respect to them or put any

issues in dispute, and on that basis the motion to dismiss was

granted. Why is this case not on all fours with those?

You have had the time sheets since, I think, November of last year, at a minimum, if not before. At the time, in your opposition, you claimed that the defendant hadn't yet responded to the interrogatories or requests for documents with respect to the basis for those offers, but you have certainly had ample time since then to get that information. And six months later, you have not articulated in any specificity anything defective about those offers, which is to say you haven't actually supported the proposition that there is a real dispute.

MR. ANDREWS: Your Honor, the first deposition in this case took place earlier this week. Mr. Garcia, the director of operations, who I deposed, testified --

> THE COURT: Did you get the documents that underlie --MR. ANDREWS: We have gotten some documents. We are SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

not confident that they are all the documents.

THE COURT: In what way are you not confident and why did you not raise that with me?

MR. ANDREWS: We are not confident that we have obtained all documents from the security guard company that was outsourced to provide security guard services, My Guard, which is a named defendant in the case. We thought Mr. Garcia, who is the director of operations, would shed some light on these issues. Mr. Garcia instead testified that the payroll processing took place offsite at Renaissance Equity's Borough Park headquarters. He gave us the name of the individual who is the payroll administrator. We just issued a notice of deposition for that gentleman yesterday.

We are simply not prepared to accept an offer of judgment when so many unresolved factual questions remain, where we have not even spoken to the payroll administrator, nor have named plaintiffs themselves been deposed and examined.

THE COURT: I understand. But you certainly have access to the named plaintiffs. I just don't know what factual issue does remain. They have submitted detailed time sheets specifying what hours the plaintiffs worked and how much they would be entitled to under the most generous interpretation of what happened. What remains to be determined?

MR. ANDREWS: There's a couple of things that remain to be determined. One is, and I can address the second, the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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issue of the additional named parties coming into the case and their rights. But, more importantly, the analysis of the time sheet records has to take place in conjunction with depositions of the persons with knowledge of how those records were prepared. These are documents that come from the defendants. They are not our documents. We do not fully understand them. We require the deposition of the payroll administrator. Mr. Garcia was not able to provide meaningful testimony regarding how payroll was calculated. We're still in the dark, and I don't think it's reasonable for us to be expected to accept an offer of judgment flying blind.

THE COURT: Let me turn to a different question, which is assume for the sake of argument that I find the case is moot as to the three named plaintiffs. No. 1, what remedy, I don't know if that's the right word, but what effect does that have? In other words, should judgment be entered in their favor in the amount of the offer of judgment? Should the case be dismissed as to those three essentially in light of the defendants' promise to pay that amount, and I would retain jurisdiction to enforce that promise? What do you think would happen if that were the outcome?

MR. ANDREWS: If the Court decided that the amounts were not in dispute and adequately compensated the named plaintiffs and the Court decided to enter judgment on behalf of the named plaintiffs, we would nevertheless request that the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

and make a decision that there was a common policy and practice in a vacuum without having people who are actually in the case making those applications as to what the arguments are as far as common policy and practice.

THE COURT: Let me give you some rulings and then we can figure out where we're going from there.

I agree that, as of today, the case is moot as to the three named plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have had six months in which to come forward with any evidence to suggest that the offer of judgment made on October 22 did not meet or exceed their claims, and they have failed to do so. On the basis of the decisions in Ward and Briggs that I mentioned earlier, I think that there is ample authority for the proposition that the case is moot as to them. Again, I don't entirely agree with or understand this entire area of the law, but as I indicated before, I think that ship has sailed and I'm bound by Second Circuit precedent on that. So I do think the case is moot as to them and I will enter judgment in the amount of the offer of judgment in favor of the three named plaintiffs.

That being said, I do not agree with defendants that the mootness relates back to October 22 when the offer of judgment was made. Counsel has not cited any authority for that proposition and the case that I mentioned, Reyes, stands for the opposite proposition. The facts in Reyes were quite similar to this one, and the court held that there was a live SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.